

NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR POLICE FREE SCHOOLS' DEFINITION

Dismantling school policing infrastructure, culture, and practice; **ending school militarization and surveillance**; and building a new liberatory education system

NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR POLICE FREE SCHOOLS' SURVEILLANCE DEFINITION

School surveillance is the state, its agents, and the private sector's monitoring and interpreting of information and data to control, punish, criminalize, police and profit off of our students, families, and community.

Versión en Español: Vigilancia escolar es el monitoreo y interpretación de información y datos por parte del estado, sus agentes, y el sector privado para controlar, castigar, criminalizar, patrullar y beneficiarse de nuestros estudiantes, familias, y comunidad.



WHO ARE “THE STATE, ITS AGENTS, AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR”?

- 1 School districts, police departments, other government agencies, and private companies
- 2 We see these entities as part of the School Safety Industrial Complex (adapted from Critical Resistance's Prison Industrial Complex definition), which is the overlapping interests of government agencies and of private industry that use in increased school surveillance and policing – all under the guise of improving school safety.
- 3 There is a huge profit motive for private companies – this is a \$3 billion industry (and growing)

WHAT IS “THE MONITORING AND INTERPRETING OF INFORMATION AND DATA TO CONTROL, PUNISH, CRIMINALIZE, POLICE AND PROFIT”?

- 1 Commonly known examples are cameras and metal detectors in school entrances and hallways.
- 2 Other examples include:
 - a. Technologies that monitor student devices, internet searches, and social media (like Gaggle)
 - b. Facial recognition technology and other biometric technology (using biological/physical characteristics)
 - c. Anonymous reporting systems
 - d. Data sharing and collaboration between local and federal law enforcement
- 3 Newer technologies can also rely on algorithms that are unproven and biased. These algorithms often involve some analysis (by people or by technology) attempting to predict student behavior.

WHAT IS THE EFFECT ON OUR STUDENTS, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITY?

- 1 Creates an environment of constant monitoring and an expectation of zero privacy that discourages speaking freely and creates a toxic learning environment.
 - a. Even where consent is given, people may not be fully informed or feel like they have a real choice.
- 2 Helps create and feed off the narrative that students are “violent” and need to be controlled through monitoring and intimidation.
- 3 Flags students for police or school disciplinary attention that funnels students into the school-to-prison pipeline.
- 4 Disproportionately harms Black students, other students of color, students with disabilities, immigrant students, LGBTQ+ students, and their families.
- 5 Potential violations of students and families’ rights.

COMMON EXAMPLES OF SCHOOL SURVEILLANCE

Threat Assessments	
What is it?	Threat assessment teams are made up of school personnel (usually including a school police officer) who “identify, evaluate, and address threats or potential threats to school security.” ¹ Sometimes the group speaks with students and staff, sometimes they answer questions on a form – based on what they gather, the group draws a conclusion about whether the student presents a “threat.” ² 42 percent of all public schools reported having a threat assessment team during the 2015–16 school year. ³

¹ Department of Education, FAQ, *Student Privacy*, <https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/faq/what-threat-assessment-team>.

² Miriam Rollin, *Here’s How ‘Threat Assessments’ May Be Targeting Vulnerable Students*, Ed. Post (Dec. 12, 2019), <https://educationpost.org/heres-how-threat-assessments-may-be-targeting-vulnerable-students/>.

³ NCES Blog, *What are Threat Assessment Teams and How Prevalent Are They in Public Schools?*, Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics (Jul. 10, 2018), <https://nces.ed.gov/blogs/nces/post/what-are-threat-assessment-teams-and-how-prevalent-are-they-in-public-schools>.

Threat Assessments

What is it? (cont.)	<p>The federal government came up with the idea of threat assessments teams. Secret Service first began threat assessments and put out guidance for teams following the Columbine school shooting in 1999.⁴ After the 2018 Marjory Stoneman Douglas shooting in Florida, the federal government recommitted to threat assessments as a response and the Secret Service redeveloped its guidance.⁵</p>
Why is it harmful?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Students of color and students with mental health issues or developmental disabilities are more likely to be considered dangerous or seen as threats. Albuquerque Public Schools did over half of all 2018-19 threat assessments on students with disabilities, who made up only 18% of students in the district. Black students made up 10% of the threat assessments, but only 2.6% of students in the district.⁶</i> • <i>One study has found that threat assessment processes themselves can cause trauma to a child.⁷</i> • <i>There aren't enough protections on collecting and sharing students' personal information, especially when there are police officers on the teams.</i> • <i>School districts give little information to students and families about the existence and use of these threat assessments teams.</i>
Federal/ State/Local uses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The federal STOP School Violence Act of 2018, a response to the Parkland shooting, authorized \$50 million in grants for threat assessments and training.⁸ The TAPS Act, most recently introduced in 2019, would have authorized another \$25 million per year for five years. • The federal Behavioral Intervention Guidelines (BIG) Act of 2021 passed the House of Representatives in May 2021 and was introduced in the Senate.⁹ The BIG Act would require the Department of Health and Human Services to put together recommendations for how schools should establish and operate “behavioral intervention” teams, which are intended to identify students of concern and address their behavioral issues. • 10 states have passed bills requiring or funding threat assessment teams since Parkland.¹⁰ • Virginia passed the first state law requiring K-12 schools to use threat assessment teams. Professor Dewey Cornell of UVA developed and evaluated the now-national model. • Colorado launched the anonymous threat reporting Safe2Tell hotline in 2004, a model other states also adopted. Since then, the state has opened a threat assessment resource center and created recommendations for schools to have written agreements with law enforcement agencies.¹¹

⁴ U.S. Secret Serv., *Enhancing School Safety Using a Threat Assessment Model: An Operational Guide for Preventing Targeted School Violence*, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (Jul. 2018), https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18_0711_USSS_NTAC-Enhancing-School-Safety-Guide.pdf.

⁵ U.S. Secret Serv. Nat'l Threat Assessment Ctr., *Protecting America's Schools: A U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Targeted School Violence*, U.S. Secret Serv. (2019), https://www.secretservice.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/Protecting_Americas_Schools.pdf.

⁶ Ike Swetlitz, *Who's the Threat?*, Searchlight New Mexico (Oct. 15, 2019), <https://www.searchlightnm.org/whos-the-threat>.

⁷ Carrie Jung, *Study: Assessing a Student As a Threat Can Affect Their Well-Being*, WBUR (Mar. 8, 2019), <https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/03/08/threat-assessment-effects>.

⁸ Sarah Gray, *The House Passed a School Safety Bill While Students Walked Out of Class. Here's What's in It. And What's Not.*, Time (Mar. 15, 2018), <https://time.com/5201713/what-is-stop-school-violence-act/>.

⁹ Behavioral Intervention Guidelines Act of 2021, H.R. 2877, 117th Cong. (2021), <https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/2877>.

¹⁰ The Ctr. For Civil Rights Remedies at the Civil Rights Project, et. al., *K-12 Threat Assessment Processes: Civil Rights Impacts* (Feb. 2022), <https://www.elc-pa.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/K-12-Threat-Assessment-Processes-Civil-Rights-Impacts.pdf>.

¹¹ See: Colo. Sch. Safety Resource Ctr., Colorado School Safety Resource Center Created Threat Assessment Materials, <https://cssrc.colorado.gov/threat-assessment/>.

Threat Assessments

Examples	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Parkrose High School in Portland, Oregon placed a student on the autism spectrum under threat assessment. The surveillance and suspicion caused him to withdraw from theater, get nose bleeds from anxiety, and eventually drop out.¹² • 7-year-old Jamari, a Black 1st grader with autism in Albuquerque Public Schools, was suspended after being labeled a “high level threat.”¹³ • Two middle schoolers were removed from school for at least two days for getting into an argument that allegedly escalated into the students threatening to harm each other with weapons.¹⁴ Neither of the students actually had a weapon.¹⁵
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Facial Recognition Technology

What is it?	<p>Facial recognition technology can identify faces in photos or videos and scan them against a database of people. Schools use it to spot students and others on a “threat list” and monitor everyone coming and going from a school building. Companies are also building out this technology to identify objects like guns.</p> <p>Some of these companies include: FaceFirst, BriefCam, AnyVision, SN Technologies, Suspect Technologies, RealNetworks, Panasonic’s FacePRO, Motorola’s Avigilon, Verkada, Aegis, and Face-Six.</p>
Why is it harmful?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Facial recognition technology is very inaccurate when identifying children, women, people of color, and transgender people.</i> The technology was developed based on white male adults as the standard.¹⁶ There are no studies on how effective it is on children’s faces.¹⁷ • <i>Unreliable technology could alienate students and families of color.</i> Inaccurate results could lead schools to wrongly discipline students and ban family members from visiting. • <i>It is expensive.</i> The 4,600 student Lockport City School District got \$1.4 million for a facial recognition system as part of their \$2.7 million from New York’s “Smart Schools” program. • <i>Profits benefit international policing companies.</i> At least two Israeli facial recognition companies supply the country’s army for use in check points, prisons, or drones.¹⁸ • <i>The lack of standards for data storage jeopardizes student privacy.</i>

¹² Bethany Barnes, *Targeted: A Family and the Quest to Stop the Next School Shooter*, The Oregonian/Oregon Live (Jun. 26, 2018), https://www.oregonlive.com/news/erry-2018/06/75f0f464cb3367/targeted_a_family_and_the_ques.html.

¹³ Ike Swetlitz, *Who’s the Threat?*, Searchlight New Mexico (Oct. 15, 2019), <https://www.searchlightnm.org/whos-the-threat>.

¹⁴ Traci Rosenbaum, *East Middle School students involved in threat now out of school pending threat assessment*, Great Falls Tribune (Oct. 8, 2021), <https://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/news/2021/10/08/students-involved-threat-now-out-school-pending-threat-assessment-east-middle-school-great-falls/6054975001/>.

¹⁵ Traci Rosenbaum, *Two students involved in threat at East Middle School charged with disorderly conduct*, Great Falls Tribune (Oct. 7, 2021), <https://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/news/2021/10/07/school-threat-great-falls-east-middle-school-students-charged-disorderly-conduct/6030301001>.

¹⁶ Amrita Khalid, *Facial recognition AI can’t identify trans and non-binary people*, Quartz (Oct. 16, 2019), <https://qz.com/1726806/facial-recognition-ai-from-amazon-microsoft-and-ibm-misidentifies-trans-and-non-binary-people/>.

¹⁷ *Facial Recognition Technology in U.S. Schools Threatens Rights*, Human Rights Watch (Jun. 21, 2019), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/21/facial-recognition-technology-us-schools-threatens-rights>.

¹⁸ See: Tom Simonite and Gregory Barber, *The Delicate Ethics of Using Facial Recognition in Schools*, Wired (Oct. 17, 2019), <https://www.wired.com/story/delicate-ethics-facial-recognition-schools/>, and: Drew Harwell, *Unproven facial-recognition companies target schools, promising an end to shootings*, The Washington Post (Jun. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/unproven-facial-recognition-companies-target-schools-promising-an-end-to-shootings/2018/06/07/1e9e6d52-68db-11e8-9e38-24e693b38637_story.html.

Facial Recognition Technology

Federal/ State/Local uses

- The Lockport, NY school system tried to implement facial recognition but the state Department of Education ordered it to stop. The New York state legislature considered a bill that would bar schools from using facial recognition tech until at least 2022, but that did not move forward.¹⁹
- California,²⁰ Illinois, and Texas have passed laws requiring companies to get people's consent before collecting "faceprints."²¹ Maryland passed a similar law, requiring signed consent before an employer can use facial recognition during an interview.²²
- San Francisco and Oakland have banned public agencies from using facial recognition.²³ New Hampshire did the same for all biometric data, but explicitly exempted law enforcement from its law.²⁴ California banned law enforcement from using facial recognition to analyze police body-worn camera footage, but allows facial recognition to be used on other police surveillance cameras.²⁵ Oregon passed a law similar to California's.²⁶
- Vermont banned law enforcement from using facial recognition technology.²⁷ Virginia banned only its local law enforcement from purchasing or deploying facial recognition technology.²⁸ New York banned facial recognition in schools in 2020—but there is evidence that school administrators are ignoring this moratorium and approving school districts' purchases of biometric surveillance technology.²⁹
- Other states have passed less stringent laws that require law enforcement to have some legal standard to use facial recognition. These states include Massachusetts (requires court order),³⁰ Maine (requires probable cause),³¹ Utah (requires "fair probability" of a connection with a crime),³² and Washington (requires warrant).³³
- Colorado and Montana have thus far failed to enact facial recognition technology limits or bans.³⁴
- The federal Facial Recognition and Biometric Technology Moratorium Act of 2021, which has been introduced in the Senate, would prohibit federal agencies from acquiring or using any facial recognition or biometric surveillance technology without specific authorization from Congress.³⁵

¹⁹ Jeff Preval, *State tells Lockport Schools to stop using facial recognition, again*, WGRZ (Jun. 28, 2019), <https://www.wgrz.com/article/news/state-tells-lockport-schools-to-stop-using-facial-recognition-again/71-abc0e45d-82ba-462e-8c24-b97614b7412a>.

²⁰ Elaine F. Harwell, *What Businesses Need to Know About the California Consumer Privacy Act*, Business Law Today (Oct. 7, 2019), <https://businesslawtoday.org/2019/10/businesses-need-know-california-consumer-privacy-act/>.

²¹ Drew Harwell, *Unproven facial-recognition companies target schools, promising an end to shootings*, The Washington Post (Jun. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/unproven-facial-recognition-companies-target-schools-promising-an-end-to-shootings/2018/06/07/1e9e6d52-68db-11e8-9e38-24e693b38637_story.html.

²² Labor and Employment – Use of Facial Recognition Services – Prohibition, Md. Gen. Assembly (2020), <https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/Details/HB1202?ys=2020RS#:-:text=Prohibiting%20an%20employer%20from%20using,an%20interview%20by%20signing%20a>.

²³ Tom Simonite and Gregory Barber, *The Delicate Ethics of Using Facial Recognition in Schools*, Wired (Oct. 17, 2019), <https://www.wired.com/story/delicate-ethics-facial-recognition-schools/>.

²⁴ Restricting the collection of biometric data by state agencies, municipalities, and political subdivisions, and requiring the election of benefits by certain members of the judicial retirement plan or their beneficiaries, N.H. HB 312 (2014), <https://legiscan.com/NH/text/HB312/id/1024501>.

²⁵ The Body Camera Accountability Act, Cal. AB 1215 (2019) <https://www.aclunc.org/our-work/legislation/body-camera-accountability-act-ab-1215>.

²⁶ ORS 133.741 Law enforcement agency policies and procedures regarding video and audio recordings, https://oregon.public.law/statutes/ors_133.741.

²⁷ An act relating to governmental structures protecting the public health, safety and welfare, Vt. S. 124 (2020), <https://legislature.vermont.gov/Documents/2020/Docs/BILLS/S-0124/S-0124%20As%20Passed%20by%20Both%20House%20and%20Senate%20Unofficial.pdf>.

²⁸ Facial recognition technology; authorization of use by local law-enforcement agencies, etc., Va. HB 2031 (2021), <https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?212+sum+HB2031>.

²⁹ Juan Miguel and Daniel Schwarz, *State officials are disregarding the law and putting students in danger*, NYCLU (Jun. 28, 2022), <https://www.nyclu.org/en/news/ny-ignoring-ban-facial-recognition-schools>.

³⁰ M.G.L. ch.6 §220, <https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleII/Chapter6/Section220>.

³¹ An Act to Increase Privacy and Security by Regulating the Use of Facial Surveillance Systems by Departments, Public Employees, and Public Officials, Me. L.D. 1585, http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/display_ps.asp?id=1585&PID=1456&num=130.

³² Government use of facial recognition system with image database–Restrictions–Process–Disclosure, Utah Code §77-23e-103, <https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title77/Chapter23E/77-23e-S103.html>.

³³ Paresh Dave and Jeffrey Dastin, *Washington State signs facial recognition curbs into law; critics want ban*, Reuters (Mar. 31, 2020), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-washington-tech/washington-state-signs-facial-recognition-curbs-into-law-critics-want-ban-idUSKBN213AS>.

³⁴ E. Bartlow Keener, *Facial Recognition: A New Trend in State Regulation*, Business Law Today (Apr. 25, 2022), <https://businesslawtoday.org/2022/04/facial-recognition-new-trend-state-regulation/>.

³⁵ Facial Recognition and Biometric Technology Moratorium Act of 2021, S.2052, 117th Cong. (2021), <https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/2052>.

Facial Recognition Technology

Examples	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facial recognition technology identified a student who had been expelled as someone on the district's "watch list," and a Sheriff's deputy escorted him out of his sister's graduation.³⁶ In Fulton County, facial recognition technology designed to identify students who violated their schools' mask mandates mistakenly flagged students eating lunch or taking a drink of water.³⁷ In Houston, similar biometric technology flagged students who had biked to school as having abnormally high temperatures and mistook white students wearing light-colored masks as violators of a mask mandate.³⁸
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Student Device and Social Media Monitoring

What is it?	<p>School districts contract with companies to monitor students devices and/or social media (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, etc.) claiming they can "identify sexual content and drug and alcohol use; prevent mass violence, self-harm, and bullying; and/or flag students who may be struggling with academic or mental health issues and need help."³⁹ It is growing in response to school shootings. Some companies also monitor the entire geographic area near the school, including adults.⁴⁰</p> <p>Some of these companies include: Gagggle, Social Sentinel, DigitalStakeout, Geo Listening, Securly, Firestorm, and Snaptrends.</p>
Why is it harmful?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>There is no evidence that these programs, and the money spent on them, are doing any good.</i>⁴¹ Language processing cannot pick up on humor or sarcasm, which creates false alarms. <i>Social media can unearth personal information that a student may not want to share at school, such as whether they identify as LGBT or their mental health status.</i> <i>Surveillance hurts freedom of expression</i> – it makes people less likely to freely speak, connect with others, or even look at websites when they think they are being watched.⁴² Women, young people, and non-white or non-English speaking populations are especially affected by this chilling effect.⁴³ <i>Programs have lower accuracy with slang and languages other than English.</i>⁴⁴ This helps create a disproportionate impact on students of color and immigrant students. <i>There are no guidelines on how social media information is kept</i> – it could stay in a student's school or law enforcement record indefinitely.

³⁶ Tom Simonite and Gregory Barber, *The Delicate Ethics of Using Facial Recognition in Schools*, Wired (Oct. 17, 2019), <https://www.wired.com/story/delicate-ethics-facial-recognition-schools/>.

³⁷ Mark Keierleber, 'Really alarming': the rise of smart cameras used to catch maskless students in US schools, The Guardian (Mar. 30, 2022), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/30/smart-cameras-us-schools-artificial-intelligence>.

³⁸ Mark Keierleber, 'Really alarming': the rise of smart cameras used to catch maskless students in US schools, The Guardian (Mar. 30, 2022), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/30/smart-cameras-us-schools-artificial-intelligence>.

³⁹ Ctr. For Democracy and Tech., *Social Media Monitoring in K-12 Schools: Civil and Human Rights Concerns*, Ctr. For Democracy and Tech. and Brennan Center for Justice (2019), <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/CDT%20Brennan%20Statement%20on%20School%20Social%20Media%20Monitoring.pdf>.

⁴⁰ Benjamin Herold, *Schools Are Deploying Massive Digital Surveillance Systems. The Results are Alarming*, Education Week (May 30, 2019), <https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2019/05/30/schools-are-deploying-massive-digital-surveillance-systems.html>.

⁴¹ Faiza Patel and Rachel Levinson-Waldman, *Social Monitoring of Students Not Making Schools Safer. Risks Outweigh Rewards*, Brennan Ctr. for Justice (May 14, 2019), <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/social-monitoring-students-not-making-schools-safer-risks-outweigh>.

⁴² Karen Gullo, *Surveillance Chills Speech – As New Studies Show – And Free Association Suffers*, Electronic Frontier Foundation (May 19, 2016), <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/05/when-surveillance-chills-speech-new-studies-show-our-rights-free-association>.

⁴³ Hannah Quay-de la Vallee, *The Chilling Effect of Student Monitoring: Disproportionate Impacts and Mental Health Risks*, Ctr. For Democracy and Tech. (May 5, 2022), <https://cdt.org/insights/the-chilling-effect-of-student-monitoring-disproportionate-impacts-and-mental-health-risks/>.

⁴⁴ Natasha Duarte, et. al, *Mixed Messages? The Limits of Automated Social Media Content Analysis*, Ctr. For Democracy and Tech. (Nov. 2017), <https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Mixed-Messages-Paper.pdf>.

Student Device and Social Media Monitoring

Federal/ State/Local Uses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At least 63 school districts purchased social media monitoring services in 2018, spending over \$1 million.⁴⁵ Over 100 have hired companies between 2013 and 2018.⁴⁶ The Florida law passed in 2018 required the state's Department of Education and law enforcement to create a central database capturing information including from social media.⁴⁷ 81% of teachers reported that their school used some sort of software to monitor students' digital activity on their devices. Notably, the impact of this monitoring is especially focused on those students who rely on school-issued devices—which indicates that low-income students are surveilled more than their wealthier peers.⁴⁸ Over 200 school districts in Texas alone have contracted with private vendors for social media monitoring technologies as of June 2022.⁴⁹
Examples	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A student at Evergreen Public High School in Washington state wrote to another student about their breakup: "Tomorrow it will all be over." The district sent local police to the family's home in the middle of the night for a welfare check.⁵⁰ In the 2013-14 school year, Huntsville School District in Alabama expelled 14 students over social media posts, 12 of whom were Black, despite Black students making up only 40 percent of the district's student population.⁵¹ Another student was suspended for wearing a sweatshirt honoring her deceased father in an Instagram photo – the school suspected her of being in a gang from the clothing colors and her "OK" hand sign. Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District purchased social media monitoring services for nearly \$20,000. Used at least as recently as the 2019-2020 school year, the services offered by vendor Social Sentinel did not prevent the deadliest school shooting since Sandy Hook—despite the fact that the shooter posted concerning content online multiple times before the shooting.⁵² Six students who had a group conversation on Snapchat at Priceville Junior High, in Alabama were investigated by police for an alleged threat to the school. Though law enforcement found that the threat was not credible, one of the students faces potentially being prosecuted on a terrorist threat charge.⁵³

⁴⁵ Faiza Patel, et. al., *School Surveillance Zone*, Brennan Ctr. For Justice (Apr. 30, 2019), <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/school-surveillance-zone>.

⁴⁶ Aaron Leibowitz, *Could Monitoring Students on Social Media Stop the Next School Shooting?*, The New York Times (Sept. 6, 2018), <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/us/social-media-monitoring-school-shootings.html>.

⁴⁷ Benjamin Herold, *Florida Plan for a Huge Database to Stop School Shootings Hits Delays, Legal Questions*, Education Week (May 30, 2019), <https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2019/05/30/florida-plan-for-a-huge-database-to.html>.

⁴⁸ Bridget McCrea, *Are Schools Disproportionately Surveilling Students Who Rely on School-Owned Devices?*, EdSurge (Jun. 15, 2022), <https://www.edsurge.com/news/2022-06-15-are-schools-disproportionately-surveilling-students-who-rely-on-school-owned-devices>.

⁴⁹ Shelly Brisbin, *Texas schools lead the nation in the use of social media surveillance*, KERA News (Jun. 7, 2022), <https://www.keranews.org/texas-news/2022-06-07/texas-schools-lead-the-nation-in-the-use-of-social-media-surveillance>.

⁵⁰ Benjamin Herold, *Schools Are Deploying Massive Digital Surveillance Systems. The Results are Alarming*, Education Week (May 30, 2019), <https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2019/05/30/schools-are-deploying-massive-digital-surveillance-systems.html>.

⁵¹ Sharada Jambulapati, *Story from the Field: Children of Color Pushed Out of Alabama Schools Over Social Media Posts*, Southern Poverty Law Ctr. (Jul. 9, 2015), <https://www.splcenter.org/news/2015/07/09/story-field-children-color-pushed-out-alabama-schools-over-social-media-posts-0>.

⁵² Ari Sen, *Uvalde CISD purchased social media monitoring service years before shooting*, The Dallas Morning News (May 25, 2022), <https://www.dallasnews.com/news/investigations/2022/05/25/uvalde-cisd-purchased-social-media-monitoring-service-years-before-shooting/>.

⁵³ Kait Newsum, *Student could face terrorism charges after threat made to Priceville school*, WHNT (Feb. 10, 2022), <https://whnt.com/news/decat/authorities-investigating-priceville-school-threat/>.

Data Sharing Agreements

What is it?	School districts enter into agreements with outside stakeholders in order to share information and data about students. Also known as “Integrated Data Structures” or “Integrated Data Systems,” these are often seen as streamlining the supports that students receive.
Why is it harmful?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Exacerbates harms for students who are already more likely to be discriminated against, especially those already more likely to receive suspensions and expulsions.</i> Data sharing agreements can involve the use of predictive analytics, or use of an algorithm to predict juvenile justice system involvement. Using current data to build trends for future students’ outcomes can reproduce the effects of past discrimination.⁵⁴ • <i>It can expose personal information to law enforcement</i> by combining multiple sensitive data sources, including foster care and school records. This can hurt student and family privacy.
Local Uses (and Resistance!)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In California, the Silicon Valley Regional Data Trust is an integrated data system through which Santa Clara, San Mateo, and Santa Cruz counties share information among public schools, health and human services organizations, and juvenile justice systems.⁵⁵ • In St. Paul, Minnesota, the Coalition to Stop the Cradle to Prison Algorithm defeated a city and county plan to share information and use predictive analytics on juvenile justice. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Minnesota school districts that were found by the state to have discriminated against Black, brown and indigenous students in assigning out of school suspensions wanted to use out of school suspensions as a <i>predictor</i> for future juvenile justice involvement.⁵⁶ – The organizers broke down the proposed policies for elected officials and partners, supported parents as advocates, and held community workshops for community members to share their concerns. • Pasco County School District was revealed to be operating a ‘predictive policing’ data-sharing agreement with the Sheriff’s Office, where they used data to “compile a secret list of schoolchildren it believed could ‘fall into a life of crime.’” The U.S. Department of Education opened an investigation into the district after tens of thousands of students, parents, and community members called on the school district to end their data-sharing program.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Stephen Buranyi, Rise of the racist robots – how AI is learning all our worst impulses, The Guardian (Aug. 8, 2017), <https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/aug/08/rise-of-the-racist-robots-how-ai-is-learning-all-our-worst-impulses>.

⁵⁵ Rosalyn Allison-Jacobs, *IDS Case Study: Silicon Valley Regional Data Trust*, Actionable Intelligence for Social Policy (Dec. 2018), <https://1slo241vnt3j2dn45sty90db-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/SVRDT-.pdf>.

⁵⁶ Cyndi Perkins, *Q&A with Algorithmic Integrity Advocate Marika Pfefferkorn*, Michigan Tech News (Nov. 18, 2019), <https://www.mtu.edu/news/stories/2019/november/qa-with-algorithmic-integrity-advocate-marika-pfefferkorn.html>.

⁵⁷ Kathleen McGrory and Natalie Weber, *Feds investigating Pasco schools giving student data to sheriff*, Tampa Bay Times (Apr. 19, 2021), <https://www.tampabay.com/investigations/2021/04/19/feds-investigating-pasco-schools-giving-student-data-to-sheriff/>; Kathleen McGrory, et.al, *Congressman urges probe of Pasco school data program*, Tampa Bay Times (Jan. 19, 2021), <https://www.tampabay.com/investigations/2021/01/19/congressman-urges-probe-of-pasco-school-data-program/>.

COMMON THEMES

- Reinforces the profiling of students of color, students with disabilities, and other groups deemed “suspicious.”
- Little to no data protections despite increasing surveillance.
- These are presented as “solutions” to school shootings, without any regard for the fear and violence that police and these policing structures create in schools nor the for the ineffectiveness of each of these practices.
- Millions of \$\$\$ spent on these school policing methods, instead of on the supports our communities consistently ask for.

WHAT WE CAN TRACK LOCALLY

- School board meetings – Local boards usually have to approve contracts with outside companies.
- Legislation – State legislatures and city councils set their budgets and can pass laws banning or regulating school policing.